

The role of LNG in the energy sector transition Regulatory recommendations

Frontier Economics study for GLE – Final results

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Study sponsors



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<u>Context</u>: Significant amounts of renewable and low-carbon gas/fuels need to be imported to achieve decarbonisation, via various potential pathways



<u>Challenge</u>: All potential import pathways face significant <u>barriers</u>, which prevent these imports from happening without further policy action

		Pathway 1 Upstream greenification	Pathway 2 Downstream low-carbon H2	Pathway 3 Upstream H2	Pathway 4 E-Fuels		
€	Cost	Renewable/low-carbon technolo1. Incomplete internalisatio2. Technological immaturity	gies <u>cost more</u> than high-carbon a n of societal cost of carbon emission of	alternatives. This is caused by:			
C				import facilities (liquid H2)			
~~~	Demand	large-scale storage of H2         Limited existing hydrogen demand means significant uncertainty for producers, import facilities, network operators and conversion cost / complexity for end users and infrastructure       Uncertain de existing uses					
		<b>Lack</b> of a common way of descrict challenging for production locate	ibing the <b>carbon content and the</b> d outside EU, i.e. Pathway 1, 3 an	sustainability of renewable/low d 4)	-carbon gas (especially		
ഫ്റ്റ	Certification			Exporting and importing infrastru further technically. Safety issues	cture needs to be aligned needs to be addressed		
e 28	Co- ordination		Large scale infrastructure inversibly on import/LNG terminal clarity over roles, e.g. to what e handling	estment required on several stage level), implying coordination cha extent are LSOs allowed to take ar	es in the value chain (incl. Illenges, including lack of a active role in CCSU / CO ₂		
<b>46</b>		<b>Policy coordination</b> (see Pathways 3 and 4)		<b>Policy coordination</b> is a barrier chain, particularly if upstream prodependent on subsidies within the	across countries and the value oducers in non-EU countries are le EU		

# Policy recommendations: In the long run EU ETS is key, but near-term policies are needed to support renewable & low-carbon gas take-up

- All pathways require cost support for production of renewable and low-carbon commodities
  - Long-run: The EU ETS should be expanded to further sectors (e.g. heating, transport) to internalise cost of carbon emissions and enforce competition between carbon abatement technologies incl. renewable and low-carbon gas. This needs to be accompanied by measures to prevent carbon leakage (e.g. a carbon border adjustment mechanism)
  - <u>Short-run</u>: To kick-start exploitation of renewable and low-carbon commodities and overcome technology immaturity, further support on upstream, infrastructure and/or downstream level is needed.
- Additional measures are needed in the hydrogen pathways (2 and 3) due to limited existing hydrogen demand and the lack of a H2 T&S regulatory framework
- Coordination between EU/non-EU states is important for pathways where production takes place outside the EU (1, 2, and 4)
- LNG terminals are well placed to facilitate many of the pathways through utilising existing equipment, expertise, and personnel skills in relation to the transport of liquified gas.
  - EU policy should provide clarity of roles and ensure there are no unnecessary barriers, including supporting competition between alternative import routes

# Key* policy recommendations per pathway: Different import pathways need tailor-made policy actions, and LNG infra can play a role in all paths

	Pathway 1 Upstream greenification	Pathway 2 Downstream low-carbon H2	Pathway 3 Upstream green H2	Pathway 4 E-Fuels
Cost & Demand	<ul> <li>Upstream CfD/FiT paid to green CH4 producers; <u>OR</u></li> <li>Downstream tradeable RLCC* obligation on industry / retailers / suppliers</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Downstream tradeable renewab obligation on existing H2 users, v use in the gas network up to the b</li> <li>Upstream CfD/FiT paid to H2 prodemand risk from producers</li> <li>CAPEX support for infra convertion</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Upstream CfD/FiT paid to e- fuels producers; <u>OR</u></li> <li>Downstream tradeable RLCC obligation on industry / retailers / suppliers</li> </ul>	
	Expansion and ongoing	t (for relevant users only)		
Co- ination	<ul><li>Govt facilitates coordination</li><li>Investor protection</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Development of H2 and CO2 T&amp;S regulatory framework</li> </ul>		<ul><li>Govt facilitates coordination</li><li>Investor protection</li></ul>
ordi		on coordination		
rt- tion	Downs	tream certificate of (avoided) opera	ting emissions and broader sustair	nability
Cer		ndards		

Role of LNG import facilities and associated policy recommendations						
<b>LNG terminals already able to</b> <b>import bioLNG/synLNG</b> , and could support management of commodity quality at import	Policy clarity on roles of actors (L to ensure no unnecessary barriers e	SO, TSO) within the H2 framework .g. re $CO_2$ capture and handling				
		Possibility to convert LNG import equipment using CAPEX subsidy				
		Competition between different import routes supported by ensuring subsidies are neutral to import route				

frontier economics * Further policy recommendatinos in the main body of this deck report.

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# **Renewable & low-carbon gas** will play a major role to achieve EU's climate targets alongside electrification, which is now widely recognised

Chemical <u>storage</u> needed to bridge seasonal renewable supply and demand



Monthly average gas load



Cross-border transport capacities for gas exceed those of electricity by order of magnitudes



8 countries shown were analysed in the 10 study



Gas <u>transport</u> infrastructure helps to match supply and demand regionally

Source: Frontier Economics (2019):The value of gas infrastructure in a climate neutral Europe, https://www.frontier-economics.com/media/3120/value-of-gas-infrastructure-report.pdf

# Significant amounts of renewable & low-carbon gas/fuels will be **imported from outside the EU**, similarly to fossil gas and fuels today

Today, more than 50% of EU's energy consumption is imported. For natural gas it is 80%

# Need for RES will be substantial, creating the challenge of finding appropriate and accepted generation locations within Europe



Despite reduced final energy demand, fulfilling total final energy consumption based on renewable electricity (or derived products such as green H2), would require EU renewable electricity production to multiply by factor 13* or more! And in many EU regions **local acceptance is already limited today...** 

#### Import allows for substantial cost savings resulting from better (e.g. climate) conditions in other areas of the world

Example: X-region comparison of cost of synthetic methane generation



frontier economics Assumptions graph on the left side: Final energy consumption develops according to IEA – World Energy Outlook 2019, Stated Policies Scenario, i.e. minus 17% by 11 2040 compared to 2018. All final energy demand which is not yet renewable (e.g. as biogas) is produced by renewable electricity (or products derived from that).

#### There is a large range of potential **countries to export** renewable and low-carbon gases and fuels – Example: PtX

Development of an international market of hydrogen recognised in the EU and German hydrogen strategies



#### **Cluster of potential export countries**

Туре	PtX Motivation and Readiness	Exam- ples
Front- runners	Especially favourable in early stages of market penetration	Norway
Hidden Champions	PtX could readily become a serious topic if facilitated appropriately	Chile
Giants	Provide order of PtX magnitudes demanded in mature market	Australia ,
Hyped Potentials	Potential to lead technology development; may depend on solid political facilitation	Morocco
Converters	Strong motivation for PtX export technology; may require political facilitation	Saudi Arabia
<b>Uncertain</b> Candidates	May drive PtX technology development, export uncertain	China

Source: Frontier Economics for World Energy Council (2019)

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# There are various potential **pathways** for the import of renewable and low-carbon gas and fuels – GLE defined four pathways (with sub-paths)

		0. LNG BAU	B	1.Upstream greenification Bio LNG Syn LNG	Γ	2. Downstream H ₂ " Methane reform. Pyrolysi	is	3.Upstream H2Liquid H2LOHCSyn LNGAmmonia	A	4. e-fuels mmonia Methanol	
A	Upstream production	Natural gas (CH ₄ )		Bio- & syn- thetic me- thane (CH₄)		Natural gas (CH ₄ )		Production of green H ₂		Production of green H ₂	
●→◆ ↓ ■←●	Upstream conversion			Enrich / methanise				LOHC / methanise / N2 HB		Ammonia / methanol conversion	
	Export terminal and shipping	Liquid CH ₄		Liquid CH ₄		Liquid $CH_4$		Liquid H2 (carriers)		Liquid NH ₃ / CH ₃ OH	
	Import terminal (EU)	Regasification of CH₄		Regasification of CH₄		Regasification of CH ₄		Regasification of liquid H ₂ (carrier)			
	Direct liquid consumption	Consumption liquid CH ₄		Consumption liquid CH ₄		Consumption liquid CH ₄		Consumption liquid H ₂ / methane/ N ₂		Consumption of NH3 / CH3OH	
♦←● ↓ ●→■	Further onshore processing					CCS/CCU (e.g. SMR / pyrolysis)					
<b>5</b>	Transmission, storage and end use	CH4		CH4		H₂ (pure or blending)		H ₂ (pure or blending)		$\rm NH_3$ / $\rm CH_3OH$	
											-

# **LNG import facilities**, having increased strongly in the EU, can play a vital role in most of these pathways & thus support EU decarbonisation



# All of these import pathways face substantial **barriers**, though, and GLE asked Frontier to analyse these & develop **policy recommendations**

#### To identify key barriers and develop policy recommendations, we took the following approach:



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# From a long list of barriers for each pathway we identified the following **key barriers** and grouped them into five categories

	Pathway 1 Upstream greenification	Pathway 2 Downstream low-carbon H2	Pathway 3 Upstream H2	Pathway 4 E-Fuels			
Cost	<ul><li>Renewable/low-carbon technologie</li><li>1. Incomplete internalisation of a</li><li>2. Technological immaturity of</li></ul>	es cost more than high-carbon altern societal cost of carbon emissions	atives. This is caused by:				
0031		RLCC produ	uction facilities				
		large-scale storage of H2	Import facilities (for liquid H2)				
Demand       Limited existing hydrogen demand means significant uncertainty for producers, import facilities, network operators and conversion cost / complexity for end users and infrastructure       Uncertain demand existing uses							
	Lack of a common way of describing the carbon content and the sustainability of renewable/low-carbon gas (especially challenging for production located outside EU, i.e. Pathway 1, 3 and 4)						
Certification			Exporting and importing infrastruct technically. Safety issues needs to	ture needs to be aligned further be addressed			
Co-		Large scale infrastructure investme import/LNG terminal level), implyin what extent are LSOs allowed to ta	e value chain (incl. possibly on I lack of clarity over roles, e.g. to ndling				
ordination	Policy coordination (see Pathways 3 and 4)		Policy coordination is a barrier across countries and the value chain, particularly if upstream producers in non-EU countries are dependent on subsidies within the EU				
Political / social	Opposition to use of biofuels and $CO_2$ if not from direct air capture	Opposition to import of fossil methane and, more particular, to CCU/S in EU Member States		Safety concerns around ammonia			
frontier economics Excluded from further analysis since these barriers are not clearly addressable through policy solutions							

# We have identifed a long list of policies for each key barrier and evaluate them by the following **criteria**



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# Uncompetitive costs are a key barrier common to all pathways, resulting from incomplete internalisation of carbon cost and low tech maturity

Barrier	Pathway 1 Upstream greenification	Pathway 2 Downstream low-carbon H2	Pathway 3 Upstream H2	Pathway 4 E-Fuels					
	<b>No CO₂ pricing</b> in many sectors (e.g. heating, transport) to appropriately reflect the additional cost for producing, importing/transporting and storing of renewable and low-carbon gases								
Incomplete internali- sation of the true cost of carbon	Bio LNG: Anerobic dig., thermal gasification Syn methane: Electrolysis and methanation	Investments for SMR/ATR or pyrolysis and CCUS Cost for infrastructure conversion / build (e.g. H2 network or CO ₂ shipping)	Electrolysis / conversion Cost for infrastructure conversion / build (e.g. ships & import terminals to H2 carriers)	Electrolysis / conversion Cost for infrastructure conversion / build					
emissions	No extra remuneration for "green" value of renewable or low-carbon gas, or of differential impact on								
1		flexibility of supply (or demand)							
	Low (large-scale) technological maturity imply learning spillovers that hinder private investment								
Techno-									
nogical maturity of renewable/	Thermal gasification (bio- LNG) and large-scale syn LNG immature	Conversion (ATR, pyrolysis & CCUS) immature	Large-scale electrolysis and conversion immature (apart from Haber-Bosch)	Large-scale electrolysis and conversion immature (apart from Haber-Bosch)					
low-carbon technolo-			Shipping / import of some H2 carriers immature						
gies		Large-scale H2 st	torage immature						
frontier economic	Local emissi	ions are often not sufficiently interr	nalised,	20					

# Carbon pricing is the preferred long term policy, but further support mechanisms are required to enable the ramp up in the transition

Long-term: Carbon pricing with carbon leakage protection

Short-term: Direct support, either downstream or upstream

- In the long term, carbon pricing for all relevant sectors is the preferred option as it allows for efficient outcomes across the economy by enforcing competition between carbon abatement technologies
- **Expansion of ETS** to further sectors (e.g. heating, transport) is preferable over introducing tax, because it is leveraging an existing efficient EU level instrument and is least distortive
  - When expanding ETS to other sectors (and likewise when introducing demand obligations) it may need an adjustment of carbon leakage protection measures, such as an extension of the carbon leakage list or some form of carbon border adjustment mechanism. A carbon border adjustment mechanism could also help renewable and low-carbon commodities in itself, but needs cautious design e.g. with respect to burden on natural gas for blue hydrogen production.
- In addition, changes to electricity and gas market design should be made in order to ensure that prices fully reflect the value (cost) which more (less) flexible resources create (impose)

In the short term some support will be needed (which in all cases may have *political issues about money leaving the EU*); there are options with upstream or downstream focus:

- Upstream support (subsidy such as CfDs/FiP/FiT or grants) can be effective to support immature generation as has been seen for REN electricity. Support should be allocated competitively, and in particular locationally neutral, incl. allowing for level playing field between EU and non-EU producers
- EU infrastructure support (grants or RAB) may be required for costs of new / retrofitted infrastructure e.g. LNG terminal retrofitting, pipeline conversion, new pipeline construction. Support should be allocated through an efficiently designed process.
- Downstream
  - One option is an obligation scheme for either general gas users/suppliers or specific gas (e.g. H2) users/suppliers to cover a share ("quota") of their consumption by renewable or low-carbon commodity (or specifically e.g. H2), building on a scheme with tradeable certificates
  - Downstream subsidies constitute an alternative that does not burden but incentivises (low-carbon) gas use, but has no precedent and arguably provides less investor certainty over cost and demand

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# Switching cost/complexity for end users and uncertainty about future uptake are key **demand barriers** for the H2 pathways (2 & 3)



#### Different measures may be required in relation to different segments of demand

Demand creation policies	Short term: obligation on RLCC	•	A <b>tradeable obligation to consume certain shares of renewable/low-carbon gas</b> could be imposed on existing grey H2 users. They would be likely to choose low-carbon hydrogen as the simplest alternative. <b>Measures to support less mature technologies</b> e.g. R&D and innovation funding.
	Medium term: obligation on RLCC reviewed and extended	•	<ul> <li>A tradeable obligation to consume renewable/low-carbon gas could be placed on gas retailers / specific sectors for use in gas networks up to the blending limit.</li> <li>Initially the obligation could be technology neutral to allow networks / consumers to choose the most cost efficient gas (biomethane, renewable/low-carbon hydrogen)</li> <li>If renewable/low-carbon hydrogen maturity issues are still present, then a specific hydrogen sub-obligation could be used which would ramp up over time</li> </ul>
	Long term: upstream support with complementary measures	•	Beyond existing H2 customers and limited grid blending, new H2 users face more substantial switching costs associated with converting equipment. These users will require <b>subsidy support for switching CAPEX</b> and potentially subsidy or stabilisation of the ongoing H2 price to minimise cost risks. Switching support is likely to need to be accompanied by <b>upstream support for producers</b> to mitigate demand risk. This can be addressed through support contracts that cover producers CAPEX regardless of demand (although note there is limited precedent), or a government backstop purchase agreement. Some types of end user may need stronger measures such as specific obligations and government coordination to switch, e.g. switching large sections of the methane grid to hydrogen for domestic heating.
olementary olicies	Ensure diversity of supply	•	As H2 supply increases, <b>policy to support security of supply</b> should ensure that H2 users can be supplied from a diverse supplier portfolio. This could involve supporting imports of H2 via LNG terminals and other import facilities in addition to domestic production.
Com	СВАМ	•	In all cases, a <b>carbon border adjustment mechanism</b> (CBAM) is a desirable complement to limit offshoring risk for producers.

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# Certification and some standardisation forms the basis for future renewable/low-carbon commodity markets

Barrier	Pathway 1 Upstream greenification	Pathway 2 Downstream low-carbon H2	Pathway 3 Upstream H2	Pathway 4 E-Fuels
1. Certifi- cation	Lack of a common way of c Same barrier	lescribing the carbon content	and the sustainability of ren This may be especially cha located outside EU	ewable/low-carbon comm. llenging for production
2. Tech. standar- disation			Exporting and importing infr aligned further technically. S addressed further, too.	rastructure needs to be Safety issues needs to be
	In RED II already so ■ Two certificates w ■ Tradeable God ■ Sustainability savings and m → Different uses ■ Obligation for Me ones (this is option ■ "Mass balancing into existing infras	ome form of "certification" add vith different purposes <b>D</b> for all renewable energy <b>certificate</b> for biofuels, biolic <b>hass balancing</b> refer to different form of certificates to <b>issue GoO o</b> onal) <b>g" approach may impede</b> the structure (e.g. may prevent m	dressed, but <b>some barriers</b> quids and biomass fuels, incl ficates <b>only for renewable sources</b> e <b>blending</b> of renewable/lov hixing of bioLNG to LNG in fu	remain: uding GHG emissions s, but not for low-carbon v-carbon commodities ueling stations)

#### Certificates of (avoided) operating emissions are essential for solving the cost and demand barrier, while standardisation may reduce cost

A single standardised certificate scheme proving at least carbon content is required

- For a number of policies addressing the demand and cost barrier especially for the downstream obligations – a certificate scheme is required which proves at least the carbon content of renewable/low-carbon commodities. Including sustainability aspects would be advantageous if feasible.
- A single scheme or at least interoperability of schemes across EU Member States and across different energy carriers is advantageous as it offers opportunities and reduces transaction costs for market participants.
- Conversion from one carrier to another needs to be possible as we have multiple conversions along the value chain for some pathways (e.g. electricity to hydrogen to ammonia to hydrogen in path 3).

Establishement of technical standards on international level

- As commodities are not "new", some form of technical standardisation is likely to be available already, but e.g. new types of transports for hydrogen or direct consumption of ammonia in ships may require additional technical standards incl. safety regulations.
- International technical standardisation is demanding, but can be worth to develop as widely applied tech. standards create security for private investors and reduce cost.
- Updating of tech. standards is an ongoing issue espec. for rather immature technologies
- **LNG terminals** and other import infrastructure can play a role in managing gas quality standards at the point of import.

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# Coordination of investment along the value chain and across countries is relevant for aligning supply (outside EU) and (EU-)demand

Barrier	Pathway 1 Upstream greenification	Pathway 2 Downstream low-carbon H2	Pathway 3 Upstream H2	Pathway 4 E-Fuels
1. Coordi- nation	High investment cost on production/conversion level	"Old world" in terms of international coordination	High investment cost on prod	uction/conversion level
between exporting	<ul> <li>Bio LNG: Anerobic digestion, thermal</li> </ul>		<ul><li>Large-scale renewables</li><li>H2 production via electrolys</li></ul>	is
countries and EU (importing countries)	<ul> <li>gasification plants</li> <li>Syn methane: Electrolysis and methanation</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Conversion for shipping (liquefaction, hydrogenisation, methanisation, ammonia)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Conversion of H2 to ammonia / methanol</li> </ul>
2. Coordi-	No substantial new infrastructure required	<b>New large scale infrastructure</b> challenges, including <b>lack of cla</b> active role in CCSU / CO ₂ handl	e investment required, which will arity over roles, e.g. to what extending or TSOs in P2G production	involve coordination ent are LSOs allowed to take an
nation within the		H2 T&S (repurposed pipelines / infrastructure)	LNG terminals and new	
EU		<ul><li>H2 production (SMR or pyrolysis)</li><li>CCUS</li></ul>		None for existing uses

# Coordinating investment along the value chain effectively requires a range of policies - **<u>summary</u>**



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### <u>Roadmap</u>: In the long run EU-ETS enables a low carbon society, while near term policies are needed to support RLCC take-up



### Implementation of policies to address cost and demand barriers is different across the pathways, with additional measures needed in 2 + 3

Near term solutions are alternatives to each other		are other	Near term solutions need to be implemented as a package to address different end user groups r		Near term solutions are alternatives to each other (or as a package for new ammonia demand)	
		Pathway 1 Upstream greenification	Pathway 2 Downstream low-carbon H2	Pathway 3 Upstream H2	Pathway 4 E-Fuels	
	Upstream support (CfD	CfD/FiT paid to green CH4 producers incl. non-EU	CfD/FiT paid to renewable/low-carbon (incl. non-EU) designed to remove der	hydrogen producers mand risk	s CfD/FiT paid to e-fuel producers incl. non-EU	
	/ grant)		Regulation or subsidisation of H2 price	e for end users		
	Switching /conversion cost support		CAPEX support for infrastructure conv terminals, other import infrastructure) switching costs (industry, transport)	version (pipelines, Ll and new end user	NG Switching cost CAPEX support for new end users (transport)	
	Downstream tradable certificate	Tradable obligation on industry / retailers / suppliers to use RLC gas	Tradable obligation to use RLC gas or	existing grey H2 us	Tradable obligation on industry / retailers / suppliers to use RLC commodity	
1	with an obligation		Tradable RLCC obligation on retailers for blending up to limit (specific H2 obligation may be necessary if low maturity issues persist)		nit New ammonia transport users sues may require a renewable ammonia specific obligation	
			Market design valuing	g flexibility		
			Mandated switching may be required f e.g. large sections of the gas grid	or challenging end u	Isers	
			Support to facilities securing H2 supply	y via imports		
	Innovation support		R&D funding for less matu	re technologies		
	EU-ETS		Expansion and ongoing application of	EU-ETS system (se	ectoral)	
]	СВАМ		Carbon border adjustment (for	relevant users only)		

-ong term

### Coordination and certification policies <u>per pathway</u> shows that hydrogen pathways (2 & 3) require additional measures compared to 1 & 4

	Pathway 1 Upstream greenification	Pathway 2 Downstream low-carbon H2	Pathway 3 Upstream H2	Pathway 4 E-Fuels
Coordination	Producer and infrastructure support with conditions on coordination		Producer and infrastructure su coordination	pport with conditions on
between	Development and ongoing ens	uring of security of supply standa	rds across energy carriers	
countries and	Government facilitating private coordination	Government facilitating private coordination		coordination
$\bigcirc$	Investor protection		Investor protection	
		Develop and ongoing improvement of H2 T&S regulatory framework including clarity of LSO / TSO roles		
Coordination within the EU		Develop and ongoing improve- ment of CO ₂ T&S regulatory framework		
		EU-wide standardisation		
		Conditions on infrastructure prov	viders to coordinate	Needed for new ammonia users
	Downst	ream certificate of (avoided) oper-	ating emissions and broader sus	tainability
Certification	Harmonisation of technical standards on international level		Harmonisation of technical star	ndards on international level

# **Pathway 1**: Existing infrastructure is utilised, therefore the key policy solutions are producer support and establishing a certification system



### **Pathway 2**: A full hydrogen strategy is required, but downstream production may be easier to coordinate



*CCUS may face significant societal opposition. We have not addressed this barrier within this report. 36

**Pathway 3**: A full H2 strategy is required, along with policy support for upstream production and coordination across the value chain (1/2)



# **Pathway 3**: A full H2 strategy is required, along with policy support for upstream production and coordination across the value chain (2/2)

	Liquid H2	LOHC	Syn-LNG	Ammonia
Role of LNG terminals	<ul> <li>Possibility to convert LNG infrastructure to facilitate low-carbon H2 carrier</li> <li>Liquid H2 ships likely to be similar to LNG ships</li> <li>Cyrogenic infra (e.g. storage tanks) could be adapted</li> <li>LNG bunkering infrastructure used for liquid H2 consumption</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>No direct role for LNG terminal</li> <li>Potential role for LNG bunkering / refuelling infrastructure to be used for e- fuels</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Existing LNG infrastructure is used to import synLNG and for bunkering / refuelling</li> <li>No changes required to equipment</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Cryogenic facilities of LNG terminal could be used for storage</li> <li>Potential role for LNG bunkering / refuelling infrastructure to be used for e- fuels</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>EU policy clarity on roles of actors (LSO, TSO etc) within unnecessary barriers</li> </ul>	n the hydrogen regula	tory framework to ens	sure there are no
Policy implications	<ul> <li>Government facilitating coordination / co-location of LNG terminals / other import facilities and hydrogen industrial cluster sites to provide security of supply (imports can complement domestic production)</li> <li>Regulation of H2 infrastructure including technical standards for commodity quality of H2 imports (could be managed/supported by LNG terminal operators)</li> <li>Capex conversion support (grant or RAB) to subsidise LNG infrastructure (or other import facilities) adaptation via an efficiently designed allocation process</li> <li>Competition between liquid H2 route and alternatives (e.g. pipelines) supported by ensuring H2 subsidies are neutral to the import route</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>No additional LNC necessary to ena</li> </ul>	G-specific policy ble sub-pathway	<ul> <li>Capex conversion support (grant or RAB) to subsidise LNG infrastructure (or other import facilities) adaptation via an efficiently designed allocation process</li> </ul>

### **Pathway 4**: Level playing field should ensure that LNG can compete with e-fuels



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#### Cost barrier & solutions

<u>Demand</u> barrier & solutions

Certification barrier & solutions

**Co-ordination** barrier & solutions

### The cost barrier can be addressed by pricing the negative external effects of $CO_2$ and/or by subsidising renwable/low-carbon technologies

Measure type	Solution	Description	
Carbon cost internalisation	Expansion of <b>EU-ETS</b> system (sectoral)	For selected installations in the EU, a cap is set on the total amount of $CO_2$ emissions. The ETS regime could be extended to further installations in the EU (e.g. to the transport or private consumption sector) and could be tightened	
	<b>CO₂-Tax</b> (in non-ETS sectors)	$CO_2$ emissions from fossil fuels (in non-ETS sectors) are taxed by a certain price per kg $CO_2$ . Tax could be applied at import level or at consumption level within the EU	
Upstream support	Upstream support subsidy – CfDs (e.g. Carbon contract for difference)	Producers of a RLCC receive a subsidy to account for the difference between their production costs/sales price and the production costs/price of the fossil reference product (e.g. natural gas or grey H2). Difference could also be referenced to $CO_2$ price.	
	Upstream support – Grants	RLCC producers get a fixed grant per production unit (e.g. MW electrolyser) installed	
	Upstream support – Loans	RLCC producers get a soft loan per production unit (e.g. MW electrolyser) installed	
EU infrastructure support	<b>Conversion / build support –</b> Grant or RAB	Support for costs of new / retrofitted infrastructure e.g. LNG terminal retrofitting, pipeline conversion, new pipeline construction, storage conversion / new build	
Downstream supportDownstream scheme with an obligation on RLCC consumption		Producers sell RLCC certificates along with RLCC. For cost efficiency, these certificates can be traded de-coupled from the commodity. In addition, an obligation is placed on a party (supplier, retailer, industry) to buy (general or specific) RLCC certificates for a certain share of their commodity consumption.	
	Downstream RLCC subsidies	Retailers receive a certain amount of money if they consume RLCC instead of fossil.	
Market design Market design valuing flexibility fully		Changes to gas and electricity market design (e.g. network tariffs and levies) in order to ensure that prices fully reflect the value (cost) which more (less) flexible resources create (impose).	
	Summary refe	ers to general policies, which could be applied cross-sectorally. We do not specific solutions (such as fleet targets for OEMs in the transport sector).	

## Carbon pricing solutions internalise the cost of carbon emissions efficiently, but may be difficult to implement short-term

Solution	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Complexity / Political feasibility	Distributional effects	Shortlist policy?
Expansion of EU-ETS system (sectoral)	<ul> <li>Enables internalisation of societal cost of emissions</li> <li>But cap / CO₂ price need to be ambitious to allow profitability of any of the 4 pathways (if no further measures to address cost issue such as subsidies)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Cap &amp; trade enforces competition between CO₂ avoidance techs which ensures efficient tech choice (in static and – in case of good price management – dynamic perspective)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Building on existing system, but further sectors may require distinct design features</li> <li>Imaginable in the longerterm (e.g. beyond 2030)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Integration of additional sectors with high CO₂ avoidance cost likely to increase CO₂ price for existing ETS sectors and thus increase electricity or industry product prices</li> <li>Possibility to re-distribute additional ETS auction revenues to customers / tax payers, though</li> <li>Carbon leakage risks needs to be addressed (e.g. by special treatment for exposed domestic industry or by carbon border adjustment mechanisms)</li> </ul>	✓ (in the long-term)
CO ₂ -Tax (in non-ETS sectors)	0	<ul> <li>Sector-specific CO₂ price entails risk of bias between CO₂ avoidance techs and inefficient choice of techs</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Could be based on already implemented systems in selected EU member states, but more likely to be on member state level than EU level</li> <li>Implementation complex, especially if taxes are to avoid risk of bias between CO₂ avoidance techs</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Higher carbon taxes can have similar distributional effects to higher EU-ETS prices</li> <li>Though sector-specific CO₂ prices allow targeted taxation with fewer unintended distributional effects</li> </ul>	×

#### In the short-term, direct subsidies play an important role for enabling a large-scale roll-out of renewable or low-carbon technologies

Solution	Effectiveness		Efficiency		Complexity / Political feasibility		Distributional effects		Shortlist policy?
Upstream support scheme – subsidy in the form of a CfD	+	<ul> <li>Depends on subsidisation of the full cost difference or of OPEX</li> </ul>						<ul> <li>Distributional effects depend on source of</li> </ul>	✓
Upstream support scheme – Grants	0	<ul> <li>Funding of investment cost of early projects can lead to cost reductions and spillover effects, but is only effective if investment cost are the essential part of cost (and not OPEX)</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Tech-/product-specific approach entails risk of bias between CO₂ avoidance techs and inefficient choice of techs due to different prices for CO₂</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Acceptance of support scheme might be low due to implicit financing of installations abroad</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>money and whether guarantee of sale of RLCC to EU</li> <li>Grant may be worse as funding states have to find the cash up front.</li> <li>Loans have fewer distributional issues as only sacrifice "soft" interest.</li> </ul>	✓
Upstream support scheme – Loans	-	<ul> <li>Only addresses risks linked to openness of capital markets</li> </ul>							×
EU infrastructure conversion / build support (grant or RAB)		Subsidy directly		<ul> <li>Tech-/product-specific approach entails risk of bias between CO₂ abstement tools and</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>State aid for grants to be checked</li> <li>Existing RAB structures and regulation are</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Grant: Flexibility for funding the policy from taxpayers or gas users rather than specific end user groups</li> </ul>	
	+	addresses the need for new / converted infrastructure to support decarbonisation technologies	0	<ul> <li>inefficient choice of techs due to different prices for CO₂</li> <li>Support allocation process must be designed efficiently</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>already in place for network owners and regulated terminals</li> <li>Complex to design such that all gas customers do not pay for infra that is only being used by some</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>RAB: Existing gas network users pay for infrastructure that they may not be using</li> <li>Support for terminals must ensure level playing field between reg &amp; non- reg terminals</li> </ul>	

### .... while policies to indicate the "green" value and downstream obligations help to create demand...

Solution	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Complexity / Political feasibility	Distributional effects	Shortlist policy?
Downstream certificate scheme (define tradable certificates of (avoided) emissions) with an obligations on RLCC consumption	<ul> <li>Enforces willingness to pay for additional cost of renewable/low-carbon production such that target techs become profitable</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Tech-/product-specific approach entails risk of bias between CO₂ avoidance techs and inefficient choice of techs due to different prices for CO₂</li> <li>Absence of contractual unpinning for subsidy may result in higher overall costs (compared to producer CfD)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Generally some form of internationally tradeable certificate of (avoided) operating emissions expected to be developed</li> <li>Challenge to ensure additionality of supply and synchronicity of supply &amp; demand</li> <li>Acceptance of obligation might be low due to implicit financing of installations abroad</li> </ul>	• Extra cost borne by consumers of product to which the obligation refers (e.g. existing H2 consumers if quota forces them to source a share as green H2)	
Downstream subsidies for RLCC	<ul> <li>Subsidy needs to reflect additional cost of renewable/low-carbon-technologies, such that desired level of reduction difficult to meet</li> <li>Consumers need to favour renewable/low-carbon commodity</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Tech-/product-specific approach entails risk of bias between CO₂ avoidance techs and inefficient choice of techs due to different prices for CO₂</li> <li>Absence of contractual unpinning for subsidy may result in higher overall costs (compared to producer CfD</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The use of downstream subsidies as a route to incentivise decarbonisation has few precedents to date</li> <li>Potential superficial advantage of directing subsidies to EU consumers, but ultimately money has to reach the investor abroad anyway</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Depends on cost reflectivity of subsidy</li> <li>Distributional effects between taxpayers (or whoever is funding subsidy) and consumers</li> </ul>	×
Market design valueing <b>flexibility</b> fully, e.g. flexibility cost-reflective electricity tariffs and levies	<ul> <li>Can help to improve business case for RLCC value chain, e.g. if capacity-based electricity network tariffs for end consumers reflect real system cost of electricity peak consumption and increase value of RLCC</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Improves efficiency of investment and operation decisions</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Design of cost- and flexibility reflecting system is complex, but many efforts underway in that direction already</li> <li>Many market design features (e.g. taxes, levies and tariffs) determined on national level</li> </ul>	• Distributional effects on other gas/electricity network users	

### Carbon pricing as the preferred long term policy, but further support mechanisms required to enable the ramp up in the transition



Cost barrier & solutions

Demand barrier & solutions

Certification barrier & solutions

**Co-ordination** barrier & solutions

#### Obligation-based demand policy solutions address both demand barriers, while other policies address only (1) or (2)

We have focused on hydrogen here but similar measures could be used to

Barriers	Solution	Description support e-fuels					
	Mandated conversion to renewable/low-carbon H ₂	An obligation is placed on parties (specific industrial plants or sectors) to convert to using renewable or low-carbon hydrogen. The obligation ramps up over time					
(1) Switching cost and (2) hydrogen uptake uncertainty	Obligation on renewable or low- carbon fuel	A obligation is placed on a party to show that a percentage of the fuel they use is renewable/ low-carbon. Obligated parties can trade certificates for cost efficiency. The obligation could be placed on: end users (existing grey H2 users; industrial gas customers; transport users) or gas retailers.					
		The obligation could specify that the obligated party must use a low carbon commodity or low carbon hydrogen specifically.					
	Prohibition	Producers of high-carbon fuels are closed down over time / consumption of specific fossil fuels are prohibited.					
	Conversion support – Grant	Government directly funds customer conversions (similar to EV user grant).					
(1) Switching cost	Conversion support – RAB	Conversion costs and new pipelines are included in the regulated asset base of the network operator e.g. for network.					
	Conversion support – Loan Conversion costs are covered by government loans at favourable interest rates.						
	Long-term subsidy contract with government purchase agreement	Upstream producer subsidy contracts are long term to provide certainty. Government acts as a buyer of last resort if hydrogen demand falls below an agreed level.					
	Subsidy contracts cover CAPEX regardless of H2 demand	Upstream producer subsidy contract payments are designed to cover producers' up front CAPEX regardless of the level of H2 demand. This removes demand risk from producers (as they have certainty that their costs will be covered).					
(2) Hydrogen uptake uncertainty	Regulation or subsidy of H2 price	H2 price is regulated to give users more certainty over their future costs. The regulation could take the form of volatility smoothing, or subsidies paid to end users to reduce the H2 price					
	Carbon border adjustment	Carbon border tax is applied to imports to prevent offshoring (would need to be designed not to penalise import of natural gas for blue hydrogen production).					
	Diversity of H2 supply	Hydrogen strategy that ensures that H2 supply is diverse e.g. imports via LNG terminals and other import facilities can complement domestic production to provide users with better security of supply.					

### Obligations may need to be H2-specific to address the demand uncertainty for H2 producers

	Solution		Effectiveness		Efficiency	C	omplexity / Political feasibility	Political Distributional effects ty		Shortlist policy?
Mand	ated conversion	+	<ul> <li>Addresses switching barrier directly</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Not sector and technology neutral, entails the risk of choosing "wrong" sectors/technologies</li> </ul>	-	<ul> <li>May be politically challenging to mandate industry conversion</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Conversion costs borne by end users</li> </ul>	×
uo u	Existing grey H2 users	+	<ul> <li>Creates relatively certain demand for renewable/low- carbon H2</li> </ul>		Technology neutral option					<ul> <li>Image: A start of the start of</li></ul>
igatio RLCC	Retailers up to blending limit		<ul> <li>May not incentivise take up of H2 over other cheaper renewable/low-carbon cas</li> </ul>	+	which should incentivise take up of the most cost- effective renewable/low-		<ul> <li>Generally some form of internationally tradeable certificate of (avoided)</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Extra cost borne by consumers of low carbon gas</li> </ul>	×
ldO	Retailers / industry beyond blending limit		alternatives e.g. biomethane			operating emissions expected to be develo • Challenge to ensure additionality of supply	operating emissions expected to be developed Challenge to ensure			×
uo	Existing grey H2 users				Not a technology peutral		additionality of supply and synchronicity of supply & demand		<ul> <li>Extra cost borne by consumers of low carbon hydrogen</li> </ul>	
jation H2	Retailers up to blending limit	+	<ul> <li>Creates relatively certain demand for renewable/low- carbon H2</li> </ul>	0	option but may be efficient in the long run if there are spillovers associated with less mature hydrogen technologies			0		
Obliga H	Retailers / industry beyond blending limit		carbon H2			-	<ul> <li>May be politically challenging to oblige industry conversion without associated subsidy support</li> </ul>			×
Prohi	bition	-	<ul> <li>May not incentivise take up of H2 over other cheaper renewable/low-carbon alternatives</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Technology neutral option which should incentivise take up of the most cost- effective renwable/low- carbon option</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Precedent exists with coal phase outs / bans on diesel cars</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>May impact some consumers negatively if they are forced to switch without compensation</li> </ul>	×

# Capex support can address the cost of switching, but is likely insufficient to incentivise H2 take-up without complementary policies

Solution	Effeo	Effectiveness		Efficiency		Complexity / Political feasibility		Distributional effects	Shortlist policy?	
Conversion support: Grant (industrial and transport end users)	+ • Addre	sses switching cost	0	<ul> <li>Not sector neutral</li> <li>Grant allocation process must be efficiently designed</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Potential state aid problems</li> <li>Risk of unintended consequences depends on inclusiveness for all renewable/low-carbon technologies</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Flexibility for funding the policy from taxpayers or gas users rather than specific end user groups</li> </ul>	(With complementary policies)	
Conversion support: RAB (infrastructure e.g. pipelines)	<ul> <li>May b incent compl</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>May be insufficient to incentivise takeup without complementary policies</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Efficiency incentives can be included in the regulatory framework</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Existing RAB structures and regulation are already in place for network owners</li> <li>Complex to design such that all gas customers do not pay for H2 infrastructure that is only being used by some</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Existing gas network users pay for H2 infrastructure that they may not be using</li> </ul>	(With complementary policies)	
Conversion support: Loan (industrial and transport end users)	<ul> <li>No incloans increa assoc renew fuels</li> <li>Could measu carbon expen renew</li> </ul>	centive to take up if there is no sed profit iated with adopting able/low-carbon be useful alongside ures that make high- n fuels more sive than able/low-carbon	+	<ul> <li>Loan allocation process must be efficiently designed</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Potential state aid problems</li> <li>Risk of unintended consequences depends on inclusiveness for all renewable/low-carbon technologies</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Conversion costs borne by end users, but overall costs comparably low</li> </ul>	×	

### Long term subsidy contracts provide additional demand and price certainty

Solution	Effectiveness			Efficiency		Complexity / Political feasibility		Distributional effects	Shortlist policy?
Long-term subsidy contracts with government purchase agreement	+	<ul> <li>Provides long term demand certainty for producers / price certainty for users</li> <li>Does not address switching costs</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>H2 demand mainly policy driven so government bears demand risk</li> <li>Government only faces high costs from backstop purchases if H2 demand is low</li> <li>Long-term contracts efficient for both parties for high sunk investment</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Terms of government buyout could be complex to design (e.g. determining the threshold at which the govt buys)</li> <li>Lack of precedent</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Flexibility for funding the policy from taxpayers or gas users rather than specific end user groups</li> </ul>	
Producer subsidy contracts cover CAPEX regardless of H2 demand	+	<ul> <li>Provides long term demand certainty for producers / price certainty for users</li> <li>Does not address switching costs</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>H2 demand mainly policy- driven so government bears demand risk</li> <li>Importing country pays producer CAPEX even if H2 demand is high</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Lack of precedent</li> <li>Does not require ongoing government involvement</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Could involve high upfront costs for the importing country</li> <li>Flexibility for funding the policy from taxpayers or gas users rather than specific end user groups</li> </ul>	
Regulation or subsidisation of H2 price	0	<ul> <li>Addresses switching complexity through providing price certainty for users</li> <li>Does not address switching costs or ongoing price difference between hydrogen and high-carbon alternatives</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Regulation may be needed less over time if a liquid H2 market develops</li> </ul>	-	<ul> <li>Choosing appropriate index for H2 price is challenging when no H2 market exists</li> <li>Design of allocation of risk that cost &gt; price is complex and has distributional challenges</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Prevents producers charging excessively high prices</li> <li>Passes (some) of the cost risk to (customers or tax payers) in importing country</li> </ul>	✓
Carbon border adjustment	0	<ul> <li>Reduces offshoring risk</li> <li>Only relevant for industrial users</li> <li>Does not incentivise H2 take up specifically</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Creates a level playing field for domestic industry and imports (as long as there is an effective EU carbon tax system in place)</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Policy may have negative international trade implications</li> <li>Designing exemptions may be complex</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Increase costs to customers of industrial products</li> </ul>	(for relevant users)
Diversity of H2 supply support policy	0	<ul> <li>Reduces SoS risk</li> <li>Does not incentivise H2 take up specifically</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Competition between imports and domestic production supports efficient outcomes</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>May be political inclination to support domestic production</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>No distributional effects</li> </ul>	<u>~</u>

### In the near term, obligations can encourage H2 takeup for existing grey H2 users and limited blending...



Phase out support



Security of supply policies to support import infrastructure including LNG terminals alongside domestic production

2020

2050

...while in the longer term, new H2 users are likely to require subsidy support to switch

Cost barrier & solutions

Demand barrier & solutions

**Certification** barrier & solutions

**Co-ordination** barrier & solutions

#### The certification barrier can be addressed by developing (international) certification regimes and technical gas standards

Barrier	Solution	Description						
Certifi- cation	Certificate of (avoided) operating emissions	Development of a standardised certification regime for indicating the carbon content of (renewable/low-carbon) commodities. Interoperability of certificates at least across EU Member States and conversion from one carrier to another needs to be ensured.						
	Certificate of (avoided) operating emissions and broader sustainability	Development of a standardised certification regime for indicating the carbon content as well as the sustainability of renewable/low-carbon commodities. Sustainability refers e.g. to aspects like water scarcity and origin of feedstock. This broader certificate may also (but don't have to) include lifecycle emissions. Interoperability of certificates at least across EU Member States and conversion from one carrier to another needs to be ensured.						
Standar- disation	Harmonisation of technical standards on international level	Harmonise renewable/low-carbon commodity qualities etc. in order to create an importing infrastructure, which can be used for imports from different countries. Develop consistent safety regulations.						

### Certificates combining operating emissions and sustainability may be preferable, but realisation is demanding

Solution		Effectiveness		Efficiency		Complexity / Political feasibility		Distributional effects	Shortlist policy?
Certificate of (avoided) operating emissions	0	<ul> <li>Carbon content is traceable, but the certificate of (avoided) operating emissions does not address the sustainability aspect</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>In a global market, a single scheme offers opportunities and reduces transaction costs for market participants (and will probably outweigh negative effects from not taking individual aspects into account)</li> <li>In case of tradeable certificates of (avoided) operating emissions enable matching of renewable/low-carbon commodity supply &amp; demand without direct</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Generally some form of the certificate of (avoided) operating emissions expected to be developed, but international governance and verification will be difficult</li> <li>Difficulties increases if sustainability aspect is also taken into account (i.e. in case of certificates of (avoided) operating</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>No substantial effect (as long as without obligation)</li> </ul>	(If certificates of (avoided) operating emissions and broader sustainability are not politically feasible.)
Certificate of (avoided) operating emissions and broader sustainability	+	<ul> <li>If properly defined, the carbon content and the sustainability is traceable</li> </ul>	the the <b>+</b> eable	<ul> <li>However, additionality of supply and synchronicity of supply &amp; demand need to be addressed</li> <li>A life cycle approach would be advantageous</li> </ul>	-	<ul> <li>emissions and broader sustainability)</li> <li>Life-cycle certification would add another administrative complexity.</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Incentives for exporting countries to produce sustainably positive, but may lead to distributional effects between exporting countries</li> <li>No substantial effect otherwise (as long as without obligation)</li> </ul>	
Harmonisation of technical standards on international level	+	<ul> <li>Widely applied standards create security for private investors and reduce cost</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Individual aspects could be taken into account after the direct import infrastructure</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>International standards demanding, but there are already standards for the RLCC available, which can provide a starting point</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Standards may effect certain consumers negatively, but this could be addressed nationally</li> </ul>	

Cost barrier & solutions

Demand barrier & solutions

<u>Certification</u> barrier & solutions

**Co-ordination** barrier & solutions

#### The EU and the single member states can facilitate the development of the pathways by facilitating coordination/action of private actors

Barrier	Solution	Description
	Multilateral climate change agreements	Include renewable/low-carbon commodities in multilateral climate change agreements and renewable policies
Coordina-	Development of security of supply standards across energy carriers	Guideline on EU level, which recommends to diversify supplier countries for each renewable/ low-carbon commodity and to conclude long term contracts for ensuring long term security of supply
tion between exporting countries and EU	Government facilitating private coordination	<ul> <li>Diplomatic support</li> <li>Establish cooperation with (potential) energy exporting countries (such as the (multilateral) Energy Charter, the Africa-EU Energy Partnership and the (German) Energy Partnerships)</li> <li>Trade framework with 3rd countries on export restrictions</li> <li>Review of tariff/non-tariff import restrictions</li> </ul>
	Investor protection	International investors in production facilities receive an EU/national guarantee for the funding or operate under a clear international framework for dispute resolution
<b>(</b>	Upstream support scheme with conditions on coordination	A condition of any upstream subsidy is coordinating with other parts of the value chain (e.g. aligning timing of construction/investment or to implementing some climate policies)

# Policies addressing coordination issues on EU level deal with standardisation and regulation of hydrogen and CO₂ networks

Barrier	Solution	Description
	EU-wide standardisation	<ul><li>Visibility on gas quality for gas producers</li><li>Setting standards for blending</li></ul>
	Regulation of infrastructure providers to coordinate with/without fines/subsidies	<ul> <li>Covers inter alia coordination of investment plants or the duty to inform each other on process</li> <li>Across the value chain</li> <li>Across EU member countries</li> <li>Could be combined with fines or subsidy/grant payments to infrastructure owners or industry</li> </ul>
Coordina- tion within the EU	Regulatory framework – hydrogen T&S	<ul> <li>Clear regulatory framework for hydrogen infrastructure which sets out clarity of roles for different entities in the value chain (LSO, TSO) and does not create unnecessary barriers.</li> <li>This could encompass e.g.</li> <li>Question of permission to provide H2 transport or generation services for TSOs and LSOs</li> <li>Third party access to infrastructure</li> <li>Charging structure</li> <li>Taxes and levies</li> </ul>
	Regulatory framework – CO ₂ T&S	<ul> <li>Clear regulatory framework on CO₂ regime which sets out clarity of roles for different entities in the value chain, which could encompass e.g.</li> <li>Question of permission to provide CO₂ handling services for LSOs</li> <li>Third party access to infrastructure</li> <li>Charging structure</li> <li>Leakage liability</li> </ul>

Governments can facilitate private investment in exporting countries by extending existing policies to renewable/low-carbon commodities

Solution		Effectiveness		Efficiency		Complexity / Political feasibility		Distributional effects	Shortlist policy?
Multilateral climate change agreements	0	<ul> <li>Inclusion may increase awareness, but often further actions on national level required to implement international agreements</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Multilateral agreement may have a major signalling effect</li> </ul>	-	<ul> <li>Multilateral agreements difficult to achieve</li> <li>Risk of unintended consequences high because of many opposing interests</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>No direct distributional effects</li> </ul>	×
Development of security of supply standards across energy carriers	0	<ul> <li>Simple recommendation does not ensure reaching security of supply, but inherent value</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Measures of the guideline may lead to efficient outcomes, e.g. long-term contracts would be efficient for both parties for high sunk investment</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Introduction of an guideline is not to be expected as controversial</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>No direct distributional effects from the guideline</li> </ul>	
Government facilitating private coordination	0	<ul> <li>Government can facilitate coordination, but just addresses initial hurdles</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Existing diplomatic relationships can be used</li> <li>But risk that individual governments choose countries countries they have relationships with and so exclude key potential exporters</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Similar issues like multilateral agreements, but to a lesser extent due to more specific agreements and lower number of countries involved</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>No distributional effects</li> </ul>	
Investor protection	+	<ul> <li>Addresses country risk</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Politically desired investment in third countries are efficiently supported</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Already existing instrument</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Depends on whether this has financial consequen- ces for importing country govts</li> </ul>	Long term:
Upstream support scheme with conditions on coordination	+	<ul> <li>Can ensure adherence to co-ordination requiremetns (e.g. investment timing)</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Conditions can prevent inefficiencies across the value chain</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Acceptance of support scheme might be low due to implicit financing of installations abroad, but conditions may slightly increase acceptance on EU member state side</li> <li>However, overall complexity increases and feasibility depends on type of conditions.</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Conditions on coordination probably only have a minor impact on distributional effects, but may depends on type of condition</li> </ul>	

# A hydrogen economy requires a regulatory framework for hydrogen and $CO_2$ similar to that of natural gas today

Solution	Effectiveness		Efficiency		Complexity / Political feasibility		Distributional effects		Shortlist policy?
EU-wide standardisation	+	<ul> <li>Similar technical standards and transparency standards facilitate coordination between EU member states and implementation of an interoperable (hydrogen) infrastructure</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Reasonable technical standards can decrease overall cost if similar settings</li> <li>National regulation may be reasonable in case of specific characteristics (e.g. different types of end users prevalent)</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Certain technical standards already available, but need to develop them further</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Depends on extent to which national characteristics lead to different provisions</li> </ul>	
Regulation of infra- structure providers to coordinate with/without fines/subsidies	+	<ul> <li>Level of fines/subsidies may be crucial for final implementation</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Obligations reasonable for important aspects</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Depends on clarity of important steps/aspects to coordinate on</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>None from coordination, but maybe if joint decisions need to be made</li> </ul>	
Regulatory framework including clarity of roles – hydrogen T&S	+	<ul> <li>Depends on regulatory framework and required scope</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Depends on regulatory framework and required scope</li> <li>Articulating roles of different entities (LSO, TSO) clearly will support efficient use of existing infrastructure</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Risk allocation likely to be complex, but precedents exist</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>"Who pays" leads to distributional effects, e.g. first hydrogen users may need to pay more first or hydrogen users may need to pay for "old" natural gas grid</li> </ul>	
Regulatory framework including clarity of roles – CO ₂ T&S	+	<ul> <li>Depends on regulatory framework and required scope</li> </ul>	+	<ul> <li>Depends on regulatory framework and required scope</li> <li>Articulating roles of different entities (LSO, TSO) clearly will support efficient use of existing infrastructure</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>Risk allocation likely to be complex, but precedents exist</li> </ul>	0	<ul> <li>"Who pays" leads to distributional effects.</li> <li>Funding can be socialised across various groups (gas users, taxpayers)</li> </ul>	

### Coordinating investment along the value chain effectively requires a range of policies - <u>roadmap</u>



Develop regulatory frameworks with clarity of roles– hydrogen T&S, 2+3 CO₂ T&S 2

#### 2020



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